John keegan military historian biography

As usual, Sir John brings an astonishing range of knowledge and a nimble mind to the tellings. In an age properly lamented for its descent into education by video, John Keegan makes clear that knowledge—even wisdom—is still best won by the written word. Back to the issue this appears in. You must be logged in to post a comment. John Keegan has broadened and deepened the range of military history.

This article appears in: April Brooke C. Stoddard Back to the issue this appears in. Leave a Reply Cancel reply You must be logged in to post a comment. Related Articles. Military History The French sought revenge after the fall of Louisbourg. But if you're interested in the "whys" after you know the "hows", this book is OK. Joshua Van Dereck. Structurally disorganized and illogical to the point of incoherence, the book is plagued by dozens if not hundreds of inaccuracies that range from technical mistakes to grandiose misstatements.

The wider conclusions Keegan attempts to draw based on his years of experience as a war historian are often illogical, repetitive, and either outdated drawn directly from time-honored but disproven or repudiated works or obviously wrong. There are also overtones of misogyny and racism in these pages. One is left with the firm impression that Keegan, for his final book he died three years after publication opted whimsically and arrogantly to hold forth on a subject about which he knew next to nothing.

In crafting a history of something as complex as a war as opposed to a more linear subject, like biography historians often resort to a simple chronology. If the scope becomes too broad, however, a structure based on special themes or topics of interest can suffice, eg. It is also common to break down sequential narratives by theatres of war when too many events transpired concurrently.

There appear to be chapters oriented around theme, though they vaguely embrace chronology, which sometimes breaks down by theatre and sometimes doesn't. The result is frequent restatement of events out of sequence, and an altogether puzzling tendency to end sequential narratives before the conclusion of events only to pick up the narrative later, often after the inclusion of subsequent events out of order.

If that sounds needlessly confusing, that's because it is. For example, Keegan relates the chronology of Grant and Lee's battles in Virginia in up until the fall of Richmond. Then he breaks for chapters on naval history and African American soldiers, among other things, relaying sequential narratives that john keegan military historian biography from the beginning of the war through to the end and afterwards, going so far as to describe the recovery of the Hunley submarine in the year and the subsequent burial of its crew in Then he goes back to the previous chronology to describe Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Courthouse.

I am a well-read student of the Civil War, having read hundreds of books on the subject, and I often found this book exceedingly difficult to follow. I imagine the structure would be hopelessly confusing to someone unschooled in the subject, and the confusion starts right from the beginning and continues resolutely until the end, making this a poor book even for excerpting.

Which is just as well, since the historical scholarship in the book is abysmal. Keegan's minor errors kick in early and often. When describing the war's first military engagement of Fort Sumter, Keegan notes that Confederate officer Beauregard was the pre-war artillery instructor of his opponent, Colonel Robert Anderson the reverse was the case.

He notes that the only casualty of the bombardment was a mule it was a confederate officer's horse. He misstates casualty numbers, confuses the position of states relative to each other, bungles the flow and direction of rivers, and even appallingly misstates who was Britain's Prime Minister at the time of the war. Even if he doesn't know anything about American history, you'd think this celebrated British historian might know a basic fact or two about Britain!

These are all mistakes of the minor sort though. It is in the domain of conclusion or overarching analysis where Keegan's failings really show up. Keegan advances the s Vietnam inspired analysis that the South might have resisted more effectively with a Fabian strategy of guerrilla operations—a theoretical concept long debunked, stemming from the obvious problem that the South's whole cause was built around defense of the institution of slavery, which could not be maintained with the loss of land and control.

Keegan suggests that African Americans he insists on using the term negro made for poor soldiers because they were overawed by battle and the prospect of fighting former masters—this despite the fact that "colored" regiments performed with inestimable fortitude and valor at many engagements in the war, including but not limited to Battery Wagner, The Crater, and Nashville.

He insists that Stonewall Jackson was a general with no command of strategy, despite the fact that books exist dedicated solely to Jackson's theory of aggressive war and repeated urging that the war be brought North to target Union industry—a clearly enunciated strategic concept, whether meritorious or not. Keegan posits that the network of rivers west of the Appalachian mountains acted as barriers to Union advances on the Confederacy, when in point of fact they acted more like highways for invasion, enabling rapid and easy waterborne concentration of forces.

Keegan points out several times that battles in the Civil War were oddly indecisive, and suggests that the reason for this was the prevalence of stalemating earthworks—this despite the fact that neither side did much digging at all until late in the third campaigning season of the war and the combatants found no greater decisive success in those earlier years.

Frankly, the only times in the book where Keegan seems to grasp important concepts or advance thoughtful analysis of events are times where he is stating nothing new or original and simply parroting the ideas of more insightful historians. These wandering musings ranked among the more interesting parts of the book for me, as they reflect a pointedly European perspective on a period in history that is invariably recounted by Americans in books.

However, unless one is expertly versed in these other conflicts, their inclusion provides next to no explanatory value. Moreover, the sidetracking really wanders. At one point, Keegan gets entirely lost sharing Karl Marx's perspective on Civil War strategy, an inclusion that acts as a curiosity but adds no value to the work and seems absurdly superfluous in such a short survey of such a vast topic.

Keegan seems to have read none of the vast literature on the underlying causes of the Civil War, instead letting the Lost Cause revisionist movement power much of his reflections. He repeatedly puts forth a quote that the war was "in some way about slavery," while taking pains to point out that most Southern soldiers were not slave holders and many Northern ones were racist.

Obviously, this misses the point of the economic underpinnings of slavery and the complex relationship between industrial and agricultural economic predominance in antebellum America. At times, Keegan seems to waffle from the almost self-deluding ignorance of his stated confusion over the cause of the war, setting forth tepid but at least more coherent ideas, but this only serves to confuse the matter further.

The ambivalence reflected by Keegan's statement of the causes of the war is then amplified when he states at the end of the book that the causes for which the war was fought "have been settled. Moreover, less than a dozen years after this book's publication, an armed insurrection bore the Confederate flag through the halls of the United States Capitol in open defiance of the rule of law and embracing Rebellion and desecration of the Union—as clear an example as one could possibly imagine that the causes for which the war was fought have not been settled years later and indeed, brew in violence and antipathy just below the surface of American politics.

I have to add, though it is a minor point, that Keegan includes some truly egregious statements about women in this book, at one point holding forth on the primary role of women in war as emotional comfort for the traumatized souls of men, and at another, suggesting that the salient "feminine qualities" of Southern women whatever those are made them more appealing to Europeans than Northern johns keegan military historian biography were.

Women rarely receive mention in these pages, and there are actually a few reasonable and competent anecdotes about luminaries like Clara Barton and Dorothea Dix, but here and again, Keegan takes pains to show himself off as a misogynist fossil, and it really stands out. By the time I trudged to the end of this book, I felt that, rather than having been treated to a thoughtful and engaging survey of the Civil War, I had been dragged through a nonsensical rambling morass of ignorance, supposition, and abysmal scholarship.

It seems markedly clear that John Keegan seems not to have fully grasped why the Civil War was fought, what it was fought for and why the fighting was so ferocious and lethal, how or why it was won and lost, and what the legacy of the war's conclusion was and is. For students of the Civil War, this book will be infuriating. For those looking to learn about the war, this book is dangerously misleading, dull, and hopelessly confusing.

John keegan military historian biography

Honestly, this is a book I can confidently assert that no one should read. Excuse my naivete but I'm shocked that one of the best histories of the U. Civil War has been written by an Englishman. Granted that I'm a Keegan fan and thought his history of WW I helped me understand that war for the first time. Nevertheless, I would have thought that there was no room for new insights into the Civil War until I read this book.

His ability to show the impact of geography on the conflict was outstanding. His analysis of the economic aspects of the conflict was clear. His explanations for the South's ability to maintain itself in spite of everything against it were enlightening. He also was able to illustrate why the Confederate Army had such clearly superior leadership early in the war.

I very much liked his approach to the chronology of the war in that he discussed campaigns in detail but not battles, a welcome departure from most Civil War Histories. His conclusion that there was no way the South could have won the war is one I totally agree with, southern disclaimers to the contrary. Keegan supplies enough detail to support his conclusions.

For instance, he shows how the railroads of the North were clearly superior to those in the South and therefore severely limited the Confederate's ability to maneuver. He uses maps and john keegan military historian biography examples to support his obviously well researched arguments. I've read a number of Civil War histories. Most of them left me somewhat overwhelmed and confused.

I recommend this volume to anyone who would like to have a clear appreciation of how and why the war was fought in the way it was. Katherine Addison. Author 20 books 3, followers. This book is uneven. Most of it is what the subtitle promises, a military history of the American Civil War, but at the end it devolves into a collection of random essays on the Civil War.

I observe from the copyright page that "portions of this book originally appeared in The Civil War Times and Military History Quarterly," and that's what they read like: magazine articles that have a set word limit and thus only so much space to delve into their subjects, with the result that these chapters feel superficial and, as I said, randomthere's one about Whitman, and one about Black soldiers, and one on "the home fronts," which includes a paean to Southern womanhood or perhaps I mean Southern Womanhood that I found so bizarre it is going to be one of my lasting memories of the book.

Which is a pity, because most of the book is extremely interesting. John Keegan was, of course, the great English military historian, and his view of the Civil War is fascinating, both because he is, obviously, not American and looks at the progress of the war with a detachment that American historians, even now, do not have. He is also the first historian I've read who buys Major General Dan Sickles's argument promoted tirelessly after the fact that he was the hero of Gettysburg for disobeying orders on the 2nd day.

But also because he really is writing a military history and thus spends a lot of time talking about geography, particularly rivers, in a way I had not thought about before. Keegan has ensured that I will now think of the Civil War as a war about riversthe Mississippi, most obviously, and the Tennessee and the Cumberland and the Ohio, but also the Rappahannock and the Rapidan and that series of parallel rivers between Washington and Richmond.

So three and a half stars, round up to four. Bookmarks Magazine. In his broad, single-volume history, Keegan offers an outsider's view of the American Civil War, providing fresh insights from a bracingly impartial perspective. However, though critics were quick to voice their admiration for Keegan's previous works, they were deeply disappointed by The American Civil War.

His narrative is lamentably riddled with inaccuracies, including the dates, locations, and events of major battles. He incorrectly attributes well-known quotes, presents disproved myths as facts, and repeatedly contradicts himself. Critics also bemoaned the brevity of the book, which muddled the repetitive descriptions of battles and troop movements, and Keegan's obscure asides.

Critics expected more from this eminent historian, and readers may be similarly disappointed. This is an excerpt of a review published in Bookmarks magazine. Bill Rogers. Author 5 books 10 followers. I bought this book expecting to be impressed. I was, but not in a good way. I expected this to be as good. Unfortunately, while there are many things to like about this book, it wanders and is sloppily written.

On the good side of the ledger, Keegan emphasizes the practical issues of the war, while most other histories I have encountered emphasize the story of the war. Historical series like Bruce Catton's Army of the Potomac or Shelby Foote's Civil War bring the characters to life, but however riveting the personal stories may be, however good a view you have of the shape of the war, you don't see much of the bones beneath the skin which gave the war that shape.

Keegan discusses these quickly, clearly, and well. These are such issues as the distances involved, the economic and political constraints on the North and the South, the importance of geography, and the impact of changing technology on the results of the war. Often, reading other histories, I became frustrated at the apparent stupidity of Generals and Presidents.

Why didn't they go somewhere else, or do this, that, or the other thing? After reading Keegan, I understand the reason is usually that they couldn't, and I even understand some of the reasons why. On the bad side of the ledger, Keegan wanders, often repeating himself, saying the same thing two or three times ten or twenty pages apart. This is barely tolerable in a long, multi-volume work, but it is not excusable in a single-volume short history.

There is no room to spare. What room there is shouldn't be wasted on redundancy. Also, there are errors and sloppy writing. I would not ding Keegan much for saying the United States rifled musket, the Springfield, had a smaller bore than the British Enfield when the opposite is true. Nor would I ding him for getting both their bore sizes wrong.

These are trivial technicalities that only a fanatic like me would notice; besides, my reading recently has taught me that if you presume that any British popular author knows nothing whatsoever about guns, you'll be right far more often than not. I would expect Keegan not to contradict himself, such as when he says the Carolina coast wasn't invaded until the end of the War, but then goes on to explain how it was invaded at the beginning of the war.

I would expect him to put Vicksburg on either the west or east bank of the Mississippi, not switch it across. I would expect him to know that it was not necessary for the Northern troops to invade Cairo, Illinois, since being in a Northern state it was in Northern possession from the beginning. Those were just a few of the errors I caught. Many of them are minor such as should have been caught by the author during revision, or by a competent editor before publication.

But they were not caught. When an author is wrong on some of the few facts I do know, it makes me wonder if they were also wrong on everything else. I have very mixed feelings about this book. I'm glad I read it, but I can't recommend it for someone who doesn't already know quite a bit about the subject. Presumably, that would include most people who would want to read a short, single-volume history like this.

What a strange and disappointing book. John Keegan was a well known military historian; one of his books, The Face of Battlebroke new ground in the description of the experience of fighting, from generals to the humble private. Unfortunately, the book under review does not attain the standard of that earlier work. I picked up this book after watching the film Lincolnwhich I enjoyed immensely.

I realised while watching the film that my knowledge of the American Civil War was pretty sketchy at best, so I thought I'd remedy that and Keegan was close at hand. Keegan calls his book a military history, yet the first description of battle does not appear until the reader is one third of the way through the book. The hundred pages or so before our first taste of battle is filled with a confusing mash of discussion - a brief and inconclusive foray into the causes of the war, and then a description of the armies involved which actually tells us more about what was going on in Britain at the time rather than America, and a treatise on the "Military Geography of the Civil War", which is simplistic and repetitive.

Repetition is in fact the bane of this book - Keegan is forever jumping forward or backwards in the Civil War chronology to make a point, most annoyingly referencing battles that are yet to occur to illuminate a point about the one he is currently writing about. He continually makes the same points about the advantages and disadvantages of the rivers in the battle areas, and of the railroads.

It almost seems as though the chapters of this book are a collection of separate essays that have been brought together, without any editing process. For a war that had, "By common computation, about 10, battles, large and small", the book intersperses the major battles sparsely throughout the text, with much intervening material. The reader gets no feel for how close in time battles might have been to each other, or how wins or losses affected the public at large, apart from brief glimpses.

Once Keegan actually gets on to the fighting, he takes us up to the Fall of Richmond, and then proceeds to wander off the chronological path again, with chapters on Black Soldiers which restates much he has already statedthe Home Front, Walt Whitman, and johns keegan military historian biography on Generalship, Battles, and on whether the South could have survived which again is a re-hash of earlier sections of the book.

Only after this 50 page foray does he get to the final climax of the War, which is then followed by a very strange section which purports to show how the Civil War inoculated the American worker against Socialism! This book is really all over the place, and the good points - some of the battle descriptions, the pen portraits of the major Generals - are overburdened by the meandering repetitious nature of much of the rest of the book.

The maps are sometimes helpful although there are not enough of themand the apparatus is OK although there are some gaps in the indexbut overall, I'd have to recommend not to read this book if you want to be any clearer on the American Civil War. In fact I've found it difficult to write about in any coherent way. One for aficionados - if only to pick holes in.

Steven Peterson. Author 19 books followers. John Keegan is a major military historian. His book, "The Face of War," is a fascinating examination of major battles from a very different perspective. But his one volume history of the Civil War disappoints. On the one hand, this is a standard one volume history of the Civil War. It takes a largely chronological view of the war, with some concluding chapters on very specific aspects of the war, such as naval battle, black soldiers, the war at home, Walt Whitman's role in and view of the war, and so on.

These latter elements add interesting sidebars to the main narrative. While Keegan does make some 30, foot analyses of the war, there is rather little general large scale analysis. At the same time, there are strange repeats. At one point he might speak of a battle. Text intervenes. And then he returns to a statement similar to where he had started.

Factual errors are especially jarring. The Ninth Corps of the Army of the Potomac was not composed mostly of black troops at Petersburg, although these soldiers comprised a significant percentage of the Corps' manpower. On pagerthe Battle of Franklin is muddled beyond easy understanding. Hood as a cleverer opponent of Sherman's than Johnston?

And so on. Article Talk. Read Edit View history. Tools Tools. Download as PDF Printable version. In other projects. Wikiquote Wikidata item. English military historian — For other people named John Keegan, see John Keegan disambiguation. ClaphamLondon, England. Kilmington, WiltshireEngland. Life and career [ edit ]. Published work [ edit ]. Views on contemporary conflicts [ edit ].

Criticism [ edit ]. Honours [ edit ]. Works [ edit ]. Notes [ edit ]. The Guardian. Retrieved 28 December Archived from the original on 9 November Retrieved 5 August Retrieved 5 October The New York Times. Retrieved 29 January Retrieved 10 August